Last Wednesday (January 25, 2006), the terrorist group Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian parliament. As Hamas has been central in the frequent and incessant attacks on Israeli settlers (quickly taking credit for brutal attacks against the populace), this election has many wondering what will become of the fragile stability–if one could call it that–which currently exists in this region of the Middle 
East.
I wonder: Could the rise of Hamas to legally recognized political power, in the long run, actually serve to advance peace in the area, rather than the doomsday predictions of outright war on Israel which many commentators currently offer (which I suspect are more the result of ratings grabbing rather than actual engagement and assessment of the issues involved)? The following is a possible scenario:
1. Surely, Hamas is a religiously motivated organization that relies upon its authority to compel its sympathizers to comply with its wishes. However, as Palestinians, Hamas is also passionately nationalistic in its goals. This, of course, is one of the main impetuses for Hamas to participate in a legally sanctioned political process–i.e., despite their violent methods, they truly wish to be a sovereign nation.
2. Because of this willingness to participate in the legal process of elections, it is also clear that Hamas realizes that in order to establish real power and authority, it will have to rely upon foreign aid. This foreign aid, however, can no longer come from shady dealings with rogue nations such as Iran or from power brokers in other countries currently ostracized from the world community. Rather, I think Hamas is beginning to realize that in order to accomplish its goals, it must become a contributing and accepted player in the global community. First of all, as recent reports have shown, Hamas is nearly bankrupt. Forecasts indicate that it will currently be unable to meet even the first month’s salaries of its newly appointed officials and aids. As most Western nations are resolutely refusing to cooperate with Hamas in its current form, it is evident that if the Hamas-led Palestinian authority wants to become a stable organizing government (regardless of its actual intended goals), it must work within the framework of the Western, global economy. This, of course, will require a radical shift in ideological makeup, both actual and rhetorical.
3. As mentioned above, the ability of the Hamas-led Palestinian authority to become a solvent, stable member of the world community will require several ideological compromises on behalf of the Hamas leadership. While powers outside of the government will most likely continue with their radical agenda for a time, those in governmental leadership will be absolutely forced to concede a great deal to the world community in exchange for support, both political and economic. As time progresses, and the political Hamas leadership gains more and more power (again, within the context of the world community), it is inevitable that the ideological distinctives which once defined Hamas as a radical religious terrorist organization will be left by the wayside in preference of economic support from the world community and the perpetuation of its political power in the potentially soon-to-be-realized independent Palestinian state. History has shown that religious convictions will normally be tempered tremendously in the face of the preservation of political power. I predict that if the Hamas-led Palestinian authority becomes a functioning member of the world community, these things will naturally happen and the terroristic strains which once marked this organization will be marginalized within that which was once sympathetic to it.
East.I wonder: Could the rise of Hamas to legally recognized political power, in the long run, actually serve to advance peace in the area, rather than the doomsday predictions of outright war on Israel which many commentators currently offer (which I suspect are more the result of ratings grabbing rather than actual engagement and assessment of the issues involved)? The following is a possible scenario:
1. Surely, Hamas is a religiously motivated organization that relies upon its authority to compel its sympathizers to comply with its wishes. However, as Palestinians, Hamas is also passionately nationalistic in its goals. This, of course, is one of the main impetuses for Hamas to participate in a legally sanctioned political process–i.e., despite their violent methods, they truly wish to be a sovereign nation.
2. Because of this willingness to participate in the legal process of elections, it is also clear that Hamas realizes that in order to establish real power and authority, it will have to rely upon foreign aid. This foreign aid, however, can no longer come from shady dealings with rogue nations such as Iran or from power brokers in other countries currently ostracized from the world community. Rather, I think Hamas is beginning to realize that in order to accomplish its goals, it must become a contributing and accepted player in the global community. First of all, as recent reports have shown, Hamas is nearly bankrupt. Forecasts indicate that it will currently be unable to meet even the first month’s salaries of its newly appointed officials and aids. As most Western nations are resolutely refusing to cooperate with Hamas in its current form, it is evident that if the Hamas-led Palestinian authority wants to become a stable organizing government (regardless of its actual intended goals), it must work within the framework of the Western, global economy. This, of course, will require a radical shift in ideological makeup, both actual and rhetorical.
3. As mentioned above, the ability of the Hamas-led Palestinian authority to become a solvent, stable member of the world community will require several ideological compromises on behalf of the Hamas leadership. While powers outside of the government will most likely continue with their radical agenda for a time, those in governmental leadership will be absolutely forced to concede a great deal to the world community in exchange for support, both political and economic. As time progresses, and the political Hamas leadership gains more and more power (again, within the context of the world community), it is inevitable that the ideological distinctives which once defined Hamas as a radical religious terrorist organization will be left by the wayside in preference of economic support from the world community and the perpetuation of its political power in the potentially soon-to-be-realized independent Palestinian state. History has shown that religious convictions will normally be tempered tremendously in the face of the preservation of political power. I predict that if the Hamas-led Palestinian authority becomes a functioning member of the world community, these things will naturally happen and the terroristic strains which once marked this organization will be marginalized within that which was once sympathetic to it.
