Omnipotence...Part Deux

A few weeks ago, I noted some preliminary issues relating to the subject of God's "omnipotence." In this, I discussed whether or not the concept of "omnipotence" is a helpful concept for understanding the parameters and possibilities of divine action. After a bried examination of some of the seminal philosophical issues involved, I concluded that the concept of "omnipotence" is ultimately unhelpful in critically describing the nature and possibility of divine action, as the definition of "omnipotence" must eventually be reduced to a tautology--i.e., "God can do that which God can do."

Continuing on, I would like to briefly note some issues relating to the relationship of human logic and divine ability. This discussion is actually bourne out of conversation in which I have been engaged in a discussion forum at christianforums.com. The questions posed were, "Can God do that which is logically impossible, such as make a square circle?" and "What is the relationship between logical and God's action?" The following is my response to the questions:

Logic is defined by God's actions and nature, not the other way around. God is not unable to do the impossible. After all, as the action of God determines that which is within the realm of possibility, any "impossibility" does not have actual existence. In this sense, God is not incapable of doing anything, for one cannot be incapable of doing that which does not exist as a possibility.

In an irrelevant sense, God is theoretically incapable of doing a lot of things. However, as God is the very ground of that which exists as possibility, the "impossibilities" do not have existence and, therefore, should not even be brought into question.

It would be like asking, "Is it possible for God to not exist?" While it is theoretically possible to conceive of non-existence, non-existence for God is impossible. After all, one has to "exist" in order to non-exist, for the non-existence of something cannot be established without it's previous (or concomitant) existence. Therefore, even though it is impossible for God to not exist, the "impossibility" is not an "actual" and is therefore a non-entity when applied to God.

The same rule applies to the "rock" question. One could say it is impossible for God to create a rock so big that God can't lift it. However, the potential for something to exist which is greater than God is a non-entity, and the actual existence of such would violate the preceding argument about God's non-existence. So then, as with the example of non-existence, the impossibility of God creating a rock so big God can't lift it is an absurdity, and not an actual inability.

Although I think this argument is sound in relation to describing the parameters of God's action, it simply serves to support my original thesis that the concept of "omnipotence" is ultimately unhelpful for actually describing the nature of the action of God. As shown above, the "possibility" of God's actions is precisely defined by that which God does. It is not "possible" to conceive of impossibility for God, as the possibility of any "actual" is based explicitly in the action of God. Therefore, once more, the definition of "omnipotence" is reduced to, "God is able to do that which God is able to do." Moreover, as the very definition of "possibility" of action is defined by the very acts of God, the definition of omnipotence could actually be further reduced to, "God does that which God does."