Those who affirm the canons of Calvinistic philosophy often laud the “logical” coherence of its systematic formulation. In this post, I would like to turn the tables on this methodological assumption, showing how Calvinistic philosophy, while perhaps “logical,” leads to a horribly perverse image of the divine nature and will of God. I shall do this through a syllogistic form and shall concentrate upon the origin of evil.
A: God has eternally decreed all that comes to pass.
B: That which God decrees proceeds from the free and boundless will of God.
C: The will of God is essential with God’s being.
Proposition: Evil exists.
Therefore:
A: Because God has eternally decreed that evil should exist, or come to pass:
B: Because the existence and perpetuity of evil proceeds from the free and boundless will of God.
C: Because the will of God is essential with God’s being;
D: It is logically concluded that evil is essential with the being of God.
In response, I suspect a couple different approaches may (and will) be taken. I assume many will argue with the relationship between “will” and “being.” Note that I have carefully qualified the language: “essential with.” I think this prevents a bifurcating of will and being, while also avoiding conflating them en toto.
With that caveat, some may object that the syllogism doesn’t stand because it is based upon a pejorative argument; i.e., if “evil exists” were replaced with the less negative “humans exist,” perhaps the syllogism would fall. While I considered this in my statement of the syllogism, I eventually decided to proceed, for my issue with Calvinistic philosophy is not limited to its inadequate accounting for the existence of evil, but more importantly is directed against the concept of “eternal decrees” altogether. I think the entire notion of eternal decrees is philosophically untenable not only in reference to origin of evil, but also in relation to everything else that is not “God.” In other words, replacing “evil” with “puppies” creates just as horrid of a picture of God, for puppies are no more essential to the nature of God than is evil. When speaking of God, we must avoid an all-too-easy anthropological reductionism. That is, we must allow for the reality that God’s existence is not dependant upon nor qualified by God’s relationship to creation. While this may be difficult or perhaps even impossible to express through human language (which is, by default, anthropologically qualified at every level), we must resist capitulating our conception of the eternality of God to the limitations of our means of expressing it. This is, in my opinion, where Calvinistic philosophy fundamentally fails, for it makes that which should be metaphorical and mysterious into rigid propositional statements and affirmations. By doing so, however, Calvinism has adopted a thoroughly human-centric approach to speaking about God, one which necessarily makes that which God has ordained intrinsically essential to the very being and nature of God.
A: God has eternally decreed all that comes to pass.
B: That which God decrees proceeds from the free and boundless will of God.
C: The will of God is essential with God’s being.
Proposition: Evil exists.
Therefore:
A: Because God has eternally decreed that evil should exist, or come to pass:
B: Because the existence and perpetuity of evil proceeds from the free and boundless will of God.
C: Because the will of God is essential with God’s being;
D: It is logically concluded that evil is essential with the being of God.
In response, I suspect a couple different approaches may (and will) be taken. I assume many will argue with the relationship between “will” and “being.” Note that I have carefully qualified the language: “essential with.” I think this prevents a bifurcating of will and being, while also avoiding conflating them en toto.
With that caveat, some may object that the syllogism doesn’t stand because it is based upon a pejorative argument; i.e., if “evil exists” were replaced with the less negative “humans exist,” perhaps the syllogism would fall. While I considered this in my statement of the syllogism, I eventually decided to proceed, for my issue with Calvinistic philosophy is not limited to its inadequate accounting for the existence of evil, but more importantly is directed against the concept of “eternal decrees” altogether. I think the entire notion of eternal decrees is philosophically untenable not only in reference to origin of evil, but also in relation to everything else that is not “God.” In other words, replacing “evil” with “puppies” creates just as horrid of a picture of God, for puppies are no more essential to the nature of God than is evil. When speaking of God, we must avoid an all-too-easy anthropological reductionism. That is, we must allow for the reality that God’s existence is not dependant upon nor qualified by God’s relationship to creation. While this may be difficult or perhaps even impossible to express through human language (which is, by default, anthropologically qualified at every level), we must resist capitulating our conception of the eternality of God to the limitations of our means of expressing it. This is, in my opinion, where Calvinistic philosophy fundamentally fails, for it makes that which should be metaphorical and mysterious into rigid propositional statements and affirmations. By doing so, however, Calvinism has adopted a thoroughly human-centric approach to speaking about God, one which necessarily makes that which God has ordained intrinsically essential to the very being and nature of God.
16 comments:
Exist....
I see you have posted on our comment thread over at my site on eternal security. The following is a portion of my last comment over there:
The doctrine of the sovereignty of God stands alone apart from Calvinism. I do not think any theological system based on Biblical theology can escape the conclusions as you draw them.
In short you have not just put Calvinism on trial here, but Biblical revelation of God. Please read my entire comment at my site and tell me how, other than my view, you can reconcile this problem and still retain Biblical revelation of God's characteristics?
I have already rejected 'C' as I affirm a difference between allowing evil and causing evil. Because a human judge allows an execution to proceed does not mean he caused the execution.
Jazzycat
Jazzy–
I see you have posted on our comment thread over at my site on eternal security. The following is a portion of my last comment over there:
The doctrine of the sovereignty of God stands alone apart from Calvinism. I do not think any theological system based on Biblical theology can escape the conclusions as you draw them.
In short you have not just put Calvinism on trial here, but Biblical revelation of God.
Of course, I would disagree, and counter that I object to Calvinism’s interpretation of the biblical literature.
Please read my entire comment at my site and tell me how, other than my view, you can reconcile this problem and still retain Biblical revelation of God's characteristics?
As I briefly mentioned in my post, I think the problem revolves around the issue of “eternal decrees.” By placing the whole of creation within the eternality of God (for again, God’s will [the source of decrees] is essential with God’s being), one is making that which is created essential with the eternal nature of God. In this sense, all things that are supposedly “other than” God (puppies, evil, ice cream, gila monsters, etc.) are actually placed within the eternal nature of God through association with God’s eternal will. Therefore, one comes dangerously close (and the line is, philosophically, indistinguishable) to a full-on pantheism, for if that which is “other” than God is actually essential with God’s being through the eternal enactment of the “other” within the will of God, it becomes actually impossible to draw a clear line between that which is God and that which is “other.” This is why I have made the case in previous posts that Calvinism is fundamentally a philosophical form of pantheism.
But if one dispenses with the notion of “eternal decrees,” the way is opened in which God can truly be conceptualized as existing in relationship to the creation as “other.”
I have already rejected 'C' as I affirm a difference between allowing evil and causing evil. Because a human judge allows an execution to proceed does not mean he caused the execution.
But the relationship which Calvinism affirms between God and creation is not anything like that of a judge to a criminal. Rather, because God has eternally, efficaciously and exhaustively determined all that will occur, God is not only the judge, but God is also the one who has set the criminal up to do that which deserves punishment. Therefore, in all stages of the crime, God is not only complicit, but ultimately and solely responsible, for it is by God’s eternal, efficacious, and exhaustive decrees that the multifarious events leading up to, including, and following the crime came to pass.
very nice exist,
Do me a favor and turn your keen intellect and rapist wit on my most recent post if you have the opportunity . . . you were always one of my favorite sounding boards as I worked through this stuff in my previous life.
bp
Exist,
I'm always fascinated by your meanderings. As you know, we differ on major fundamentals. And I still have a hard time understinding from where you are coming, theologically.
If you have the time, would you be interested in writing a post about theology proper. Who is God? Attributes? How does He interact with creation? What was His purpose in creating the universe/multiverse? Things along this thread. I would really appreciate it.
Thanks,
Austin
Exist,
Would you mind unpacking the idea that God's will is essential with His being?
Also, most Christian theologians (Calvinist, Arminian, Amaryldian, Roman Catholic, whatever...) have believed in the idea that God has two wills. While there conclusions about these wills differ, the idea is consistently seen throughout the centuries. Any thoughts on the "two will" argument?
austin--
You ask some good questions, and I will try to get to them as soon as I can (obviously, each will require some significant attention and time). In the interim, could you more precisely define what you understand by the concept of "the two will argument?" Thanks!
Exist,
Thanks for being so willing to take the time to answer my questions. I look forward to the future readings.
I'm just curious if you believe in the idea that God has more than one will (passive and active, secret and revealed, etc.). Or does He have one will?
austin--
I'm just curious if you believe in the idea that God has more than one will (passive and active, secret and revealed, etc.). Or does He have one will?
I would definitely affirm that God has "one" will. I'm not sure that "passivity" and "activity" in will is possible, for to have a "passive" will is to have an "active" will in relation to something else. Moreover, as I have claimed that God's will is essential with God's being, to advocate that God's will is divided or dualistic would be to necessarily affirm that God's being is thus also. Obviously, this is something which I would not wish to do.
What are your thoughts on this?
Exist,
Well, I guess I'm not so sure that "God's will is essential with His being."
Maybe the words "essential" and "with" could be tweaked? For example: could we say that "God's will is derived from and completely consistent with His being? His will cannot and will not (pardon the pun) contradict His essence, for the very fact that He is a perfectly consistent being.
It seems like it's possible that His being/essence is what eternally "determines" His will. His will will accord perfectly with His essence, but they are not necessarily essentially the same.
But then again, maybe we ought to define His essence before we proceed.
I know that you are not necessarily a "fan" of Reformed theology. But the Westminster Shorter Catechism makes a pretty good statement about the essence of God:
God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.
I don't think this is comprehensive - love ought to be included (as it seems to be a little bit different that goodness), and I'm sure there are others. But it seems to be on the right track. And it's these characteristics (if we can call them such) of His being that eternally consumate in His will.
I don't know if saying that His will and being are essentially the same, if we define His being as I just have above. After all, His will is not Spirit. His will is not love, He is, which eternally gurantees that His will will be love.
With regard to the will(s) of God: I do believe that He has two wills, a secret will (will of decree) and a revealed will (His law, His incarnate Word, His written Word, human conscience [maybe]).
His secret will cannot be thwarted, altered, resisted, as it will come to pass.
His revealed will can be resisted, (i.e. He wills that "all men repent.")
I'm sure you are very familiar with this idea of the two wills of God, as I have seen a few of your interactions with other Calvinists (I'm a little "c" calvninst, whereas many of your discussions seem to have been with big "C" Calvinists - I try, as much as possible, not to align myself with men as much as with Christ [big "C" Christian, little "c" calvinist]).
It is this idea of the two wills of God that I think accurately describe what we see in the Scriptures.
I look forward to your responses
God Bless You My Friend
austin--
Well, I guess I'm not so sure that "God's will is essential with His being."
Maybe the words "essential" and "with" could be tweaked? For example: could we say that "God's will is derived from and completely consistent with His being? His will cannot and will not (pardon the pun) contradict His essence, for the very fact that He is a perfectly consistent being.
It seems like it's possible that His being/essence is what eternally "determines" His will. His will will accord perfectly with His essence, but they are not necessarily essentially the same.
Thank you for the thoughts. Personally, I think the language "essential with" is important to preserve, for it allows one to speak in an intelligible way about the categories of "being" and "will." At the same time, however, it prevents one from subordinating one to the other, whether chronologically or logically. With that said, obviously I do not think that God's "will" is derived from God's "being." Rather, I think they are concomitant in existence.
But then again, maybe we ought to define His essence before we proceed.
Okay.
I know that you are not necessarily a "fan" of Reformed theology. But the Westminster Shorter Catechism makes a pretty good statement about the essence of God:
God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.
I don't think this is comprehensive - love ought to be included (as it seems to be a little bit different that goodness), and I'm sure there are others. But it seems to be on the right track. And it's these characteristics (if we can call them such) of His being that eternally consumate in His will.
I don't know if saying that His will and being are essentially the same, if we define His being as I just have above. After all, His will is not Spirit. His will is not love, He is, which eternally gurantees that His will will be love.
I disagree. After all, all of the "attributes" which you have described are only meaningful in that they are post-observational descriptions of human categories that are applied to God. For example, if we were to say that God is, in the eternal being, "love," then we have, by our linguistic propositionalizing, qualified the nature of God by something which , in the grammatical construction, is stated to be outside of God and can be referential in appeal to describing what God "is." In other words, to say that God is "love" is to say that God accurately correlates to what "love" is. However, as God, in our considerations, is the source from which all other things derive, we run into a difficulty with our language; for when we say "God is love," we are linguistically communicating that (even though we give lip-service to the notion that God is the source of all being) there is actually something outside of God (love) by which we can qualify God as "being" like unto.
I know this is technical point to make, but it is important, for it reveals how our language can lead us astray in our conception of divine ontology. Therefore, as these descriptor (love, mercy, goodness, eternal, etc.) are merely that--descriptors--I see no reason why they cannot be properly applied to the will of the divine as well.
With regard to the will(s) of God: I do believe that He has two wills, a secret will (will of decree) and a revealed will (His law, His incarnate Word, His written Word, human conscience [maybe]).
His secret will cannot be thwarted, altered, resisted, as it will come to pass.
His revealed will can be resisted, (i.e. He wills that "all men repent.")
Given your conception of the dualistic nature of the divine will, I can certainly see why you would wish to see a bifurcation (regardless of how absolute) between God's will and being. After all, if you were to adopt my conception of their relationship, the positing of the "secret will" of God in reprobation would make reprobation an inherent part of the divine ontology. Obviously, this would be somewhat of an undesirable conclusion, and I do not blame you for wish to avoid it.
I remember reading in Martin Luther a discussion about this very thing. He affirmed the "secret" will of God in reprobation and, reading between the lines, he seemed truly terrified of it (and well he should be). However, on a pastoral level, he told people to basically ignore it and to focus upon the revealed will of God as revealed in the Incarnation and Cross of Christ. This was good advice--however, I think he would have been better served in his theology if he would have simply gotten rid of the dualism.
In the final analysis--and I do not mean this with offense--it appears that the "dualizing" of GOd's will, and the consequent separating of God's being and will is not necessitated by any Scriptural considerations, but is rather based upon an errant conception of the relationship of God's will in relationship to creation. The logic goes like this:
Proposition 1: God's will, if eternal, must be absolutely efficacious in creation.
Consequent A: Some humans are reconciled with God, some are not.
Conclusion 1: God has eternally willed that some humans would be reconciled with God, and that others would not.
As I have suggested, if God's will is essential with God's being, one runs into a problem with Proposition 1, for the conclusion that GOd has eternally willed that some humans would be reprobated requires that reprobation be essentially and ontologically related to God. Since this is an undesirable conclusion, a separation is created between will and being in order to avoid attributing the negative consequences of God's will to God's being.
However, I have to push the issue farther. To be perfectly honest, I do not understand the purpose of dividing the "secret" and "revealed" will of God. For example, let's look at Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: God has eternally willed that some be saved, and other reprobated. (secret will)
Consequent 2: Some are saved, and others are reprobated.
Ante-Consequent 2: God reveals through the Incarnation that God desires the reconciliation of all. (revealed will)
Conclusion 2: The dual wills of God are opposed, and one renders the other irrelevant.
In this scenario, the "revealed" will of God is entirely superfluous within the economy of the divine life, for the eternal will has ineffably determined Consequent 2. That Ante-Consequent 2 be introduced is completely incomprehensible, and the only conclusion one can reach is that God's wills are actually opposed, or that the latter (revealed) is utilized merely for the sake of deception and veiling of the former (secret).
Exist,
At the same time, however, it prevents one from subordinating one to the other, whether chronologically or logically. With that said, obviously I do not think that God's "will" is derived from God's "being." Rather, I think they are concomitant in existence.
I too would say that God's will and being are concomitant, as they both eternally exist.
I'm not so sure that I would say that God's will is "subordinate" to His being. But it is different.
all of the "attributes" which you have described are only meaningful in that they are post-observational descriptions of human categories that are applied to God.
Well, here I will have to say that I disagree. This might be due to the fact that your a priori with regard to the Scriptures differs tremendously with mine (as we found out not too long ago). I view the Scriptures and the words in them as from the "mind" God. So any description of God in them is from God, as He has chosen to declare Himself to us; often times in ways that are intelligible (not comprehensive) and other times in ways that are "over our heads" (ie. the idea of eternality can be apprehended although not fully comprehended). And all of these attributes that were earlier listed are directly from Scripture.
For example, if we were to say that God is, in the eternal being, "love," then we have, by our linguistic propositionalizing, qualified the nature of God by something which , in the grammatical construction, is stated to be outside of God and can be referential in appeal to describing what God "is." In other words, to say that God is "love" is to say that God accurately correlates to what "love" is...for when we say "God is love," we are linguistically communicating that (even though we give lip-service to the notion that God is the source of all being) there is actually something outside of God (love) by which we can qualify God as "being" like unto.
This is a very good point. And I want to try to be extremely careful with my next comments, as they could be easily misunderstood.
When the Bible says that God is love, I take it to mean that His very essence is love. There is no such thing as love apart from God. Even human relationships and other expressions of love are derivitives of God. I don't believe that love is something to which God conforms. Rather, the expression of His person that is communicated as love (best seen in the cross) flows forth eternally from His essence.
God is love. Not God is loving, which would imply an external entity to which God conforms. But rather, His being (as the verb "to be" shows) is love. This goes for holiness (and all of His other attributes as well) also. When we say that God is holy (or His name is holy), we aren't saying that He is conforming to holiness. Rather, we are saying that He is holiness. In other words, holiness is His name, which is just another way of saying His being. There is no such thing as holiness apart from Him.
Again, our view of the Scriptures tremendously affects how we view such statements in them. For when I read that God is love, I take that as a self-description that God is communicating with us so that we might understand more of who and what God is.
Therefore, as these descriptors[sic] (love, mercy, goodness, eternal, etc.) are merely that--descriptors--I see no reason why they cannot be properly applied to the will of the divine as well.
I think that the statement that God is Spirit limits the will of God. The will is not Spirit. It is immaterial. But are all immaterial things spirit? It doesn't seem so. Numbers, propositions, logical laws are all immaterial entities that I don't think we could classify as spirit.
The word "of" is curious also. Is it possible that the will of God is the will which is from God? Or is it most likely the will which is God's? Or maybe another option? I guess it really depends on the case. And I am no grammarian.
The [sic] only conclusion one can reach is that God's wills are actually opposed
I only have one point that I will address with regard to the two will discussion for now. Are His two wills opposed? Well, let's look at one very difficult text, Acts 4:27-29. Here Peter is praying to God and he says the following:
"For truly in this city there were gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur."
Here we have a lot going on. I will try to be succinct.
First of all, Peter says that God's "purpose", which was "predestined to occur", was that Herod, Pilate, and the Gentiles and peoples of Israel would "gather together" against God's Annointed, Jesus. In other words, God purposed that sin would occur: denying the Messiah, mocking the Messiah (which is mocking God), killing the Messiah -all things that are considered sin. And God willed this. How could God have willed sin if His will is essential with His being? He could never do such a thing. So there must be another explanation.
And this is where the idea of the two will comes in. On the one hand, God's secret will (decretive will) in this passage was that Herod, Pilate, and the others would gather against Jesus. This is amazing because His secret will was made known in this one instance. On the other hand, we know that God does not want (will) sin, as He has plainly stated in His law (revealed will).
austin--
Thank you for your continued participation in this discussion.
I too would say that God's will and being are concomitant, as they both eternally exist.
I'm not so sure that I would say that God's will is "subordinate" to His being. But it is different.
The reason I used the term "subordinate" is because in your previous response, you suggested that God's will is "derived from" God's being. Such a conception would seem to indicate that some form of dependent relationship exists between the will and being, as the will has its derivation in the latter.
Well, here I will have to say that I disagree. This might be due to the fact that your a priori with regard to the Scriptures differs tremendously with mine (as we found out not too long ago). I view the Scriptures and the words in them as from the "mind" God. So any description of God in them is from God, as He has chosen to declare Himself to us; often times in ways that are intelligible (not comprehensive) and other times in ways that are "over our heads" (ie. the idea of eternality can be apprehended although not fully comprehended). And all of these attributes that were earlier listed are directly from Scripture.
As you have already noted, I would pointedly disagree on this point with you.
This is a very good point. And I want to try to be extremely careful with my next comments, as they could be easily misunderstood.
When the Bible says that God is love, I take it to mean that His very essence is love. There is no such thing as love apart from God. Even human relationships and other expressions of love are derivitives of God. I don't believe that love is something to which God conforms. Rather, the expression of His person that is communicated as love (best seen in the cross) flows forth eternally from His essence.
God is love. Not God is loving, which would imply an external entity to which God conforms. But rather, His being (as the verb "to be" shows) is love. This goes for holiness (and all of His other attributes as well) also. When we say that God is holy (or His name is holy), we aren't saying that He is conforming to holiness. Rather, we are saying that He is holiness. In other words, holiness is His name, which is just another way of saying His being. There is no such thing as holiness apart from Him.
This is fine, and I appreciate your care in the usage of your language. However, as you have even implied in your qualified language, the concepts of "love," "holiness," etc. are not really substantial--they are descriptions of how we conceive of the nature and character of God. For example, we say that God is love, again, not because God acts in accordance with what "love" is, but rather because the acts of God characterize how we understand "love." The same goes with any other attribute of God. To say that God cannot do that which is not "holy" is actually a misnomer, for that which God does is what provides the definition of "holiness." Therefore, such qualifications as "God cannot lie" are not telling something about the eternal nature of God, per se, but is rather an anthropological way of speaking about the nature of God in relationship to humanity. Such is a classic example of using metaphorical language to speak about the language of God. In doing so, we are really telling a "lie" about the nature of God (for the category of "untruth" is not even applicable to the divine nature). Yet this "lie" reveals something, in humanaly comprehensible terms, about the nature and character of God.
Again, our view of the Scriptures tremendously affects how we view such statements in them. For when I read that God is love, I take that as a self-description that God is communicating with us so that we might understand more of who and what God is.
And I, of course, understand it as a reflection of human affirmations about the nature of God in relationship to human history.
I think that the statement that God is Spirit limits the will of God. The will is not Spirit. It is immaterial. But are all immaterial things spirit? It doesn't seem so. Numbers, propositions, logical laws are all immaterial entities that I don't think we could classify as spirit.
Again, though, the language is taken too propositionally. After all, the category of "immateriality" is not really applicable to God. While it is a helpful descriptor for the human mind, it is another example of metaphorical lie telling in order to get at the truth of God. After all, if "spirit" is defined as immaterial, one has, by the very use of the word "immaterial," assumed the consubstantial existence of that which is material. In this way, the very definition of God's essence is dependent upon the existence of that which God has created. By doing this, we have, inadvertantly, of course, made the material world necessary for the existence of the divine!
This goes back to my original discussion in the post about the need for us to allow for God's existence apart from what God has created. If we do not, every propositional statement we make about God will necessitate the eternal existence of that which God has created merely for the sake of describing God, a conclusion which would severely mangle our conception of the self-existing God who is the source and creator of all that exists.
The word "of" is curious also. Is it possible that the will of God is the will which is from God? Or is it most likely the will which is God's? Or maybe another option? I guess it really depends on the case. And I am no grammarian.
Either option would seem to create a logical hierarchy between God's being and God's will.
I only have one point that I will address with regard to the two will discussion for now. Are His two wills opposed? Well, let's look at one very difficult text, Acts 4:27-29. Here Peter is praying to God and he says the following:
"For truly in this city there were gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur."
Here we have a lot going on. I will try to be succinct.
First of all, Peter says that God's "purpose", which was "predestined to occur", was that Herod, Pilate, and the Gentiles and peoples of Israel would "gather together" against God's Annointed, Jesus. In other words, God purposed that sin would occur: denying the Messiah, mocking the Messiah (which is mocking God), killing the Messiah -all things that are considered sin. And God willed this. How could God have willed sin if His will is essential with His being? He could never do such a thing. So there must be another explanation.
I agree that there must be another explanation, and I would suggest that the nature of human language and the finitude of the human mind would be the explanation. Throughout the Scriptures, God is spoken of as sovereign, and the writers affirm that the events which come to pass in human history are based upon the "will of God." However, these same writers consistently present God as also existing in dynamic relationship with the unfolding of human history, and many times God is described as immanently responding to various situations in ways that were askew of what was originally understood to be "willed of God." The explanation is that we cannot comprehend the relationship between God's sovereignty and the outworking of it within human history. To reduce it to considerations of causality is to infinitely humanize the nature of God's will and the relationship of the same with human history. Therefore, I hardly see that there is warrant from this passage, nor any other, to develop a systemic exposition of the "will of God" in relationship to space/time. The very attempt destroys any hope of getting at the mystery of God's will.
And this is where the idea of the two will comes in. On the one hand, God's secret will (decretive will) in this passage was that Herod, Pilate, and the others would gather against Jesus. This is amazing because His secret will was made known in this one instance. On the other hand, we know that God does not want (will) sin, as He has plainly stated in His law (revealed will).
Honestly, this doesn't make sense. If God has eternally decreed that Herod, Pilate and others would "sin;" and considering that God's will is equal to God's desire; I do not see how one can honestly countenance the meaningfulness of God's "revealed will," or avoid the conclusion that it is actually one of the grandest forms of deception.
Moreover, I would suggest that it is an eternal indictment upon God. Consider this:
Proposition 1: God has eternally, exhaustively and efficaciously willed that Pilate would sin.
Proposition 2: God has revealed that God hates sin.
Consequent: God hates that which God has eternally willed.
Conclusion: As I will maintain that God's will is essential with God's being, and in light of your discussion about the "dual" wills of God, the only conclusion that one can reach is that God hates Godself.
Very nice site! Definity cms call center software reporting http://www.direct-insurance-travel-travel.info/car_seat_cover_austin.html driver select car Horny lesbians milfs Free roses birthday cards toyota dealer tulsa difference between activan and valium Gambling as a wha t is lamictal
The estimation is to recreate for a Sometimes you volition win very bombastic sum of money and at times you may win cypher. [url=http://www.onlinecasinoburger.co.uk/]online casino[/url] online casinos uk gaming natural action really has get certain sizing of Manhattan, is geared to play, which brings in taxation of more than than $33 one thousand million and accounts for more than than 40 percentage of GDP. http://www.onlinecasinotaste.co.uk/
plain Vegas is considered economic value and Las Vegas Sands fund had fallen 99% from its bloom. [url=http://www.bbvcpaydayloans.co.uk/]instant payday loans[/url] payday uk You vanquish ended and it's meter to get out is quite a some other. http://www.bvfdpaydayloans.co.uk/
Post a Comment